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INTRODUCTION
Despite the conflicts and frictions in their bilateral relations, 
Russia has for years regularly invested in Belarus. Moscow’s sup-
port has become an important factor allowing the Belarusian 
economic model to continue, which in turn helps maintain the 
stability of the Belarusian political system. Russia’s continued 
readiness to offer assistance to its neighbour reflects the impor-
tance Moscow attaches to Belarus. 
In addition to the highly significant role Minsk plays in Russia’s 
foreign and security policy, and in the transit of Russian raw ma-
terials and goods, Belarus also features prominently in Moscow’s 
current policy objectives – especially in relation to two key pro-
jects: the Customs Union (CU) and the Common Economic Space 
(CES). The implementation of these projects is seen as crucial in 
Russia, particularly because Moscow hopes that Ukraine’s in-
volvement in the CU and the CES would limit its options for clos-
er integration with the European Union. For this reason, since 
2011 we have been witnessing a rise in Russian aid for Belarus. In 
2012, the support intensified and moved beyond purely financial 
help to include political assistance also. 
Moscow’s support, however, has come at a price. Alexander Lu-
kashenko has had to finalise the implementation of a number of 
changes repeatedly stipulated by Russia over the past few years, 
which have further increased Minsk’s dependence on its neigh-
bour. In addition, the mechanisms of Russia’s assistance have also 
changed – by supporting Minsk, Moscow is increasingly pursuing 
its own national interests. Russia’s stopgap solutions to Belarusian 
problems are therefore designed in such a way as to ultimately 
achieve the objectives of Moscow’s foreign policy – particularly, to 
further strengthen the links between Belarus and Russia. 
Moscow’s long-term goal is to establish control over the Belaru-
sian economy, which would also, in effect, allow the Kremlin to 
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influence the way other areas of the Belarusian state are gov-
erned. As a result, in the coming years Russian-Belarusian rela-
tions are likely to be marked by conflict. The periodic tensions, 
however, will not lead to a suspension or break-up of bilateral 
relations, as the importance Russia attaches to Belarus means 
that Moscow is ready to support Minsk despite delays in the im-
plementation of changes stipulated by Russia. Nonetheless, as 
Minsk’s dependence on Russian support deepens, Alexander Lu-
kashenko will ultimately have no choice but to gradually accede 
to Russia’s demands.
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I. RUssIa’s sUppORT fOR BelaRUs IN 2012
According to Moscow1, the value of Russia’s assistance to Belarus 
exceeded USD $6 billion in 2012 – this is a substantial amount con-
sidering that the annual revenue of the Belarusian budget oscil-
lates around the USD $16 billion mark. The assistance comes in the 
form of preferential pricing of Russian raw materials and low-in-
terest loans. For example, under the terms of a contract signed in 
November 2011, Belarus has been granted a 40-percent discount 
on Russian natural gas imports, effective from 2012. Consequent-
ly, the price of gas bought by Belarus dropped from USD $263 
in the fourth quarter of 2011 to an annual average of just under 
USD $166 in 2012, saving the Belarusian state approximately USD 
$2 billion. By way of comparison, in 2012 the price paid for Rus-
sian gas by the Republic of Moldova and by Ukraine was set at USD 
$395 and USD $430 per 1000 m3, respectively. In addition, thanks 
to Customs Union regulations, Belarus’s purchases of Russian oil 
are exempt from export tariffs. Under a four-year oil contract 
signed in 2012, Belarus pays an average of USD $404 per tonne 
(almost 17% less than in 2011). Despite raising official objections, 
Moscow effectively allowed Minsk to re-export Russian oil prod-
ucts as Belarusian solvents and thinners for a number months – 
enabling Minsk to sidestep Russia’s export tariffs. During the first 
six months of 2012, the exports of such products earned Belarus 
USD $2.5 billion2. Similar avoidance mechanisms have been used 
to re-export biofuels and heating oil.
In June 2012, Belarus received USD $440 million from the Russian-
controlled Anti-Crisis Fund of the Eurasian Economic Communi-
ty – this money was the third instalment of a USD $3 billion loan 
agreed in 2011. In December 2012, the ACF decided to transfer 
1 Interview with the senior adviser at the Russian Embassy in Belarus Valeriy 
Bondarenko, http://www.interfax.by/printable/exclusive/94718
2 In response to Russian pressure, in July 2012 such exports were suspended.
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another instalment of USD $4403. The money was paid out despite 
the fact that Belarus had failed to fully meet the conditions of the 
loan agreement, primarily those relating to the privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises4. On 18 June 2012, Belarus and Russia also 
signed a contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant in 
Belarus. Moscow has since opened a USD $10 billion credit line for 
the project5.
Russia has also demonstrated its political support for the Bela-
rusian president. Moscow has never taken any real steps to re-
move Alexander Lukashenko from power and has backed him 
at several crucial points of his presidency. However, the Krem-
lin’s relations with Lukashenko have not always been friendly. 
During the 2010 presidential elections Moscow ran a downright 
hostile campaign against the Belarusian leader6. At the moment, 
however, the relations between the Kremlin and the Belarusian 
president are demonstrably good. Lukashenko continues to en-
joy Russia’s support in his dealings with the West, and Russia op-
poses the EU/US sanctions imposed on the Belarusian political 
and business elite. In February 2012, a declaration of opposition 
3 The fourth tranche of the loan was eventually paid out in January 2013, the 
previous two tranches of USD $800 and 440 million were transferred in 
June and December 2011.
4 The credit agreement stipulates the privatisation of Belarusian state prop-
erty worth a total of USD $7.5 billion within three years. The implementation 
of the plan was to be carried out gradually through privatisation contracts 
worth $ 2.5 billion a year. To date, the government has only sold off shares in 
Beltransgaz, which generated the USD $2.5 billion planned for 2011.
5 See K. Kłysiński, M. Menkiszak, ‘Will the construction of a nuclear power 
plant in Belarus exacerbate the country’s energy dependence on Russia?’ 
OSW Commentary, No. 87, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-
commentary/2012-07-23/will-construction-a-nuclear-power-plant-bela-
rus-exacerbate-coun
6 Russia’s NTV broadcast a documentary titled ‘Krestniy Batka’ (‘Godfather’), 
which presented a series of allegations that for years have been made against 
the president by the Belarusian opposition. These included suggestions that 
Lukashenko had ordered the murders of several of his political opponents. 
On a number of occasions, Russian news bulletins and current affairs pro-
grammes also aired comments made by Belarusian opposition politicians 
who have no access to official media in Belarus.
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to the sanctions was filed jointly by Alexander Lukashenko and 
the then Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. Solidarity with 
the Belarusian leader was also expressed in a statement issued 
in March 2012 by the prime ministers of the member-states of 
the Russian-dominated Common Economic Space, in which they 
expressed their opposition to the sanctions, arguing that the 
measures were having a negative effect on all three members of 
the CES, namely Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Statements 
of support for Belarus have also been repeatedly issued by Rus-
sia’s Foreign Ministry. In addition, Belarus had the privilege of 
hosting Vladimir Putin on his first foreign visit, made in May 
2012 at the start of his third presidential term.
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II. The sTRaTegIC ImpORTaNCe  
Of BelaRUs fOR RUssIa
Russia’s support for Belarus remains a constant feature of the 
countries’ bilateral relations; the level of Moscow’s engagement, 
however, does vary depending on the quality of these relations at 
any given time. Moscow’s readiness to invest in Belarus reflects 
the unchanging strategic importance of Belarus for the Krem-
lin’s foreign, security and domestic policies, as well as Russia’s 
economic relations with its foreign partners.
The long-lasting domination over its western neighbour is often 
seen in Russia as proof of its geopolitical standing. In its relations 
with the West, Moscow uses this influence to build an image of 
Russia as a regional superpower and a centre binding together the 
post-Soviet territory. This image makes it easier for Russia to con-
vince the West of its natural power of patronage over the CIS area 
and the fact that the Kremlin should be involved in all decisions 
concerning the area.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus has been at the 
core of the integration processes in the post-soviet area. It has 
been the only CIS member-state to take part in all of the Russian-
led integration initiatives. It has also co-founded the Union State 
of Belarus and Russia – the most advanced regional integration 
project to date. Although many of the original objectives of the 
Union State have not been achieved, the project remains both 
a testing ground and an example of the extent to which particu-
lar attributes of sovereignty could potentially be ceded to Moscow 
and to see what model of integration would be most effective in 
Russia’s relations with the former Soviet Republics7.
7 The Union State of Belarus and Russia – a supranational integration struc-
ture, envisaged as a federation, established by a treaty of 8 December 1999. 
The treaty envisages deep political and economic integration of the two 
countries. Several attempts have been made at adopting the Constitutional 
Act of Union State, during which the lawmakers considered creating the po-
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Belarusian territory also plays an important role in the transit 
of Russian raw materials and goods to the West and to the Ka-
liningrad region. Although the launch of the Nord Stream gas 
pipeline and the BTS-2 oil pipeline will in the long term reduce 
the importance of Belarus as a transit country, for the time be-
ing its role remains significant – mainly due to Moscow’s desire 
to limit the volume of gas transported via Ukraine. In 2011-2012 
Belarusian pipelines transported 44.3 billion m3 of gas per year8 to 
Lithuania, Ukraine, Poland and Kaliningrad, which accounted for 
23% of Russia’s total gas exports9. This means that the Belarusian 
transit infrastructure has been used at near capacity. Moscow has 
announced plans to increase the volume of gas pumped via Bela-
rus in 2013 by as much as 25%10, but without additional pipeline 
capacity in both Belarus and other transit countries (e.g. Poland), 
such an increase will not be possible.
The Druzhba (Friendship) oil pipeline, on the other hand, carries 
app. 50 million tonnes of crude a year, which accounts for about 
21% of Russia’s total oil exports. The oil is transited through Bela-
rus to consumers in Poland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Slovakia and Bosnia. Meanwhile, the Belarusian grid is used 
to transmit electricity to the Baltic States and the Russian re-
gions of Kaliningrad, Bryansk and Pskov. In 2011, the Belarusian 
transmission lines carried 2.8 billion kWh of Russian electricity. 
sition of a Union State president. On 20 November 2000, Presidents Alexan-
der Lukashenko and Boris Yeltsin signed an agreement on adopting a com-
mon currency (Russian rouble) across the Union State, which was planned 
for 2005. However, due to differences of opinion on the nature of the inte-
gration and different national interests of both parties, the Union State has 
so far failed to reach the envisaged level of integration. Since then, its stra-
tegic significance has somewhat diminished and has been replaced by other 
integration projects covering the entire post-Soviet area.
8 http://www.interfax.by/printable/news/belarus/124917 
9 In 2012, Russia’s gas exports reached 178.7 billion m3; the Kaliningrad re-
gion receives around 1.2 billion m3 of gas a year; http://ria.ru/econo-
my/20130208/921879837.html,  http://kaliningrad.ru/news/item/6569 
10 http://www.regnum.by/news/1546830.html, http://naviny.by/rubrics/eng-
lish/2012/06/09/ic_articles_259_178119/
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Belarus is also the shortest route for rail and road transit of goods 
between Russia and Europe – with around 30% of transit cargo be-
ing transported via Belarusian territory. Thanks to the strong ties 
between Minsk and Moscow, Russia is able to ensure the security 
of its transit cargo and benefits from competitive transit fees. For 
many years, Belarus’s role as a transit country has offered Russia 
a viable alternative to relying on Ukraine for its transit capacity 
– which has also helped Moscow achieve its objectives in negotia-
tions with Kyiv.
In addition, Belarus is important to Russia from the point of 
view of defence and security policy. Of great significance is the 
country’s geographical location, which makes it the westernmost 
territory controlled by Russia (except for the Russian exclave of 
Kaliningrad). Moscow’s control over Belarus extends Russia’s se-
curity zone and moves the location of any potential Russia-NATO 
conflict away from its own territory. Under Russia’s optic, Belarus 
remains part of its security buffer zone. The S-300 PS and TOR-M2 
missile systems located in Belarus are part of the Russian air de-
fence system, aimed at protecting Russia’s western border. Over 
the next few years, the missiles are likely to be replaced by the 
new generation S-400 missiles with a range of several hundred 
kilometres, which, thanks to their location in Belarus, would 
allow Moscow to control a significant section of NATO airspace. 
In strategic military terms Belarus’s location in close proximity 
to Kaliningrad is also quite significant. The Russian enclave lies 
around 300 km west of the Russian border and is separated from 
Russia by the territories of the two countries. Meanwhile, the dis-
tance between Belarus and Kaliningrad is only approximately 80 
km. The inclusion of Belarus into the Russian security zone there-
fore reduces the isolation of the Russian exclave and allows Mos-
cow to create military scenarios based on cooperation between 
Kaliningrad and Belarusian troops. The inclusion of Belarus in 
Russia’s security zone also means that in the event of a conflict, 
NATO could find it problematic to deploy its land forces in the 
nearby Baltic States. The barely 80-km wide corridor between 
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Belarus and the Kaliningrad region could easily be invaded. In ad-
dition, Belarus hosts two Russian military facilities: a radar sta-
tion in Gantsevichi near Baranovichi, and a Baltic Fleet communi-
cations hub in Vileyka. For the time being, however, the facilities 
are of purely political significance. The Gantsevichi radar has lost 
its military significance since a more modern facility was opened 
in Kaliningrad Oblast, while the Vileyka communications centre 
is currently being transformed into an element of a joint system 
for radioelectronic warfare11.
Close relations with Belarus are also important for the Kremlin 
in the context of Russia’s domestic politics. The implementa-
tion of the integration project across the post-Soviet area enjoys 
widespread popular support in Russia. For many Russians, these 
processes confirm the country’s superpower status, which can, 
at least on a psychological level, offer some compensation for the 
poor living conditions in Russia. With regard to Belarus itself, it 
is important to stress that the country is commonly perceived 
through the prism of ‘ Slavic brotherhood’ and ‘shared Soviet 
history’. Over 74% of Russians support closer ties with Belarus12, 
while 61% of Russians still do not consider Belarus a foreign coun-
try13. Consequently, any significant weakening of ties between 
Russia and Belarus, let alone a complete reorientation of Bela-
rusian foreign policy towards the West, would generally be per-
ceived as a failure of the Russian government.
11 This paragraph has benefited from consultation with the research fellow 
for the military aspects of international security Andrzej Wilk at the Centre 
for Eastern Studies, Warsaw, Poland. 
12 Opinion poll conducted in October 2010 by the Russian Levada Centre, 
http://www.levada.ru/02-11-2010/za-poslednii-god-rossiya-i-belarus-ot-
dalilis-drug-ot-druga
13 Opinion poll conducted in October 2011 by the Russian Levada Centre, 
http://www.newsland.ru/news/detail/id/804528/ 
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III. BelaRUs IN RUssIa’s CURReNT fOReIgN 
pOlICy
Belarus also plays a vital role in the implementation of the 
current objectives of Russia’s foreign policy, which has recently 
translated into a significant increase in Russian support for its 
western neighbour.
Belarus is one of the building blocks of the eurasian inte-
gration project, which has now become a priority in Russia’s 
relations with the CIS. Moscow’s ultimate objective is to develop 
a Eurasian Economic Community bringing together the coun-
tries of the post-Soviet area in a manner similar to that achieved 
by the European Union, but retaining Russia’s current domina-
tion in the region. The creation of the Customs Union of Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2010, followed by the establishment of 
the Common Economic Space in January 2012, is seen as stepping-
stone towards achieving this goal. Since Belarus is the most ac-
tive participant in these projects, it is being used as an example in 
the formulation of Moscow’s policy in the entire post-Soviet area. 
The types of benefits obtained by Belarus from participating in 
the newly created Eurasian integration structures have been de-
signed to encourage other states in the region to follow suit. This 
is particularly important in the context of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, as Ukraine’s accession to the Customs Union and the 
Common Economic Space has now become a strategic objective of 
Russian policy towards Kyiv and the entire CIS region. Ukraine’s 
engagement with these projects would help to increase the via-
bility of the CU and the CES, although Ukraine’s integration into 
these structure is being seen primarily as a way of strengthen-
ing Russia’s influence over its western neighbour, and at the same 
time as a means of blocking, or at least limiting, the possibility of 
closer ties between Ukraine and the European Union.
By participating in the Eurasian integration project, Belarus 
has also become instrumental in Russia’s dealings with the 
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european Union. The idea of  building an economic community 
in the post-Soviet area dates back to the 1990s, although the im-
mediate impetus for the implementation of the current concept 
of Eurasian Economic Union has been the need to respond to the 
EU’s growing interest in Eastern Europe, and the launch of the 
EU’s Eastern Partnership project. Although the EU’s interest in 
its eastern neighbours has since diminished, and it has become 
clear that the Eastern Partnership will not play a significant role 
in the post-Soviet region – Russia wants to safeguard its tradition-
al sphere of  influence, including its position in Belarus, against 
a possible new wave of Western activity in the future. By putting 
in place new structures formalising its geopolitical influence in 
the region at a time when the EU is busy dealing with its economic 
crisis and is focusing on maintaining the EU’s structural cohe-
sion, Russia can rest assured that its integration initiatives will 
not provoke a response from Brussels.
Finally, Belarus also has some significance for Russia’s relations 
with the United states and for the countries’ ongoing dispute 
over the US missile defence shield. In response to Washington’s 
attempts to revive plans for the construction of the missile shield, 
and the Obama administration’s proposal to deploy mobile ele-
ments of the shield in Europe, Russian has warned that it would 
deploy Iskander missiles in Belarus and would arm Belarusian 
troops with the S-400 anti-missile systems14.
14 This issue became particularly significant during the 2012 US presidential 
election campaign, when Mitt Romney was a serious contender for presi-
dency. Romney indicated at the time that in case of his victory, Washington 
would return to the missile shield project, similar to the concept originally 
proposed by George W. Bush, a design which Russia considered particularly 
threatening to its national security.
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IV. map Of RUssIaN INflUeNCe IN BelaRUs
The benefits that Russia derives from its special relationship with 
Belarus mean that Minsk can count on Moscow’s support, es-
pecially in times of economic or social instability. This does not 
mean, however, that Russia is ready to invest in Belarus without 
seeking further concessions. For years now, the Kremlin has 
been consistently striving to increase its control over specific 
areas of Belarusian governance and the economy. By actively 
strengthening the post-Soviet links between the two countries, 
Russia has created a system of mutual interdependence that gives 
it significant influence over the most important processes taking 
place in Belarus. As a result, Russia possesses significant, though 
not fully realised, potential to steer the development of the Bela-
rusian economy. To a large extent, Moscow is able to determine 
the direction of Belarusian foreign policy, and has the capacity 
to influence political processes inside the country. It also fully 
controls Belarus’s defence policy. The intensification of Russian 
assistance observed in 2011-2012 has come at a price though – 
Russia has markedly increased the extent of its influence in 
Belarus. During this period, the Kremlin substantially strength-
ened its position within the Belarusian energy sector. It has ef-
fectively monopolised the country’s gas market by securing not 
only an exclusive deal for the supply of natural gas to Belarus but 
also by gaining complete control over the transit and distribu-
tion of gas in the country. At the same time, Moscow has blocked 
the possibility of geographical diversification of energy produc-
tion in Belarus by taking over the supervision of the construction 
and operation of a nuclear power plant in Belarus and by ensur-
ing that it has full control over the export of electricity generated 
at the plant. In addition, Russia has managed to institutionalise 
some of its economic influence in Belarus, especially by bringing 
the country into the Customs Union and by applying to it the reg-
ulations imposed on Russia by the WTO. Finally, Moscow has also 
formalised its control over parts of the Belarusian army – namely, 
the Belarusian Air Force.
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1. Russia’s control over the Belarusian economy
1.1. Economic integration
In the past two years, Russia has increased its capacity for ex-
erting institutional influence over economic processes with-
in Belarus. By joining the Customs Union, Belarus undertook to 
bring its customs policy in line with the rules of the organisation – 
although it should be noted that around 80% of the CU rates reflect 
the level of Russian tariffs. Membership of the CU also means that 
Belarus has had to open its market to Kazakh and Russian goods. 
At the same time, in 2011 Belarus agreed that the legal system of 
the Customs Union would be based on the standards set by the 
WTO, reflecting Russia’s accession to the organization. This, how-
ever, means further changes to its customs policy, effectively pre-
venting it from implementing protectionist practices that could 
shield Belarus’s inefficient production against competition from 
imported goods. Under the CU/WTO regulations, Belarus has 
been forced to, for example, reduce its agricultural subsidies by 
2016 from the current 16% to 10% of the production value15.
Moreover, stabilisation loans are no longer offered directly by 
Moscow, but instead are granted through the Moscow-controlled 
Anti-Crisis Fund of the Eurasian Economic Community (ACF 
EurAsEC). The change has been designed to make any financial 
assistance for Minsk increasingly contingent on the implementa-
tion of specific economic demands. In principle, the ACF operates 
in a manner similar to the International Monetary Fund, whose 
support is also dependent on the applicant’s progress in imple-
menting the recommended economic reforms. And although in 
reality the decisions to disburse the individual instalments of an 
ACF EurAsEC loan are highly politicised, and money has been paid 
15 See: K. Kłysiński, ‘Consequences for the Belarusian economy of Russia’s en-
try into the WTO’, OSW Eastweek, 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/eastweek/2012-09-12/consequences-belarusian-economy-russia-s-
entry-wto 
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out to Belarus despite its failure to fully meet the conditions of the 
loan, some attempt has indeed been made to link loan decisions to 
the success of economic reforms. One of the effects of the pressure 
exerted on Minsk by the ACF was, for example, the devaluation of 
the Belarusian rouble in May 2011.
1.2. Investment
Russia is the main source of direct investment in Belarus, par-
ticularly due to its involvement in the privatisation of Belarusian 
state companies. Between 2009-2012, more than 95% of Minsk’s 
proceeds from privatisation came from Russia’s purchase of Belt-
ransgaz shares16. Russia has also established a presence in the Be-
larusian petrochemical sector (42.5% stake in the Mozyr refinery 
and full ownership of LUKoil-Belarus, the owner of a network of 
petrol stations in the country) as well as in the telecommunica-
tion sector (Russia’s MTS has a 49% stake in the mobile operator 
MTS-Belarus). In addition, Moscow controls Belarusian arms pro-
ducers through the Russian consortium Oboronitelnye Sistemy.
For years Russia has been calling on the government in Minsk to 
press ahead with the privatisation of the country’s most impor-
tant companies. Lukashenko has so far tried not to give in to these 
demands, fearing Russia’s domination of the Belarusian corporate 
sector and the loss of the ability to manually manage the econo-
my, which continues to be one of the basic mechanisms used by 
the president to exercise power. Given this limitation, Moscow 
has adopted a strategy of waiting out the government in Minsk. 
Poor investment conditions in Belarus, coupled with the strong 
dependence of local companies on Russian energy supplies, 
means that Moscow needn’t fear competition from non-Russian 
investors. It is likely, however, that the next few years will see 
a steep rise in the number of Russian investors entering the 
16 Priorbank report, http://www.priorbank.by/download/info/BIG_2012-08-
21-rus.pdf
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ownership structures of Belarusian companies. Faced with 
the ever-deepening economic crisis, and without the possibility 
of support from the West, Belarus will eventually be forced to pro-
ceed with the sale of state-owned companies in order to raise the 
necessary cash to finance the running of the Belarusian state.
The list of enterprises which Moscow appears to be particularly 
interested in buying includes mainly energy companies: the Nava - 
polatsk oil refinery, the remaining stake in the Mozyr oil refinery, 
the Belarusian section of the Druzhba oil pipeline, and the Bela-
rusian gas distributor Beltopgas. Moscow would also like to pur-
chase the local lorry manufacturer MAZ and the manufacturer 
of earth-moving equipment BelAZ, as well the potassium salts 
mining and processing plant Belkaliy, the chemical plants Polim-
ir and Grodno Azot, the Belarusian Metallurgical Plant BMZ, and 
Beltelecom – the largest telecom operator in Belarus.
1.3. Energy
The Belarusian economy is entirely dependent on Russian fos-
sil fuels, particularly on Russian gas17. Since 2005, gazprom has 
been the sole supplier of natural gas to Belarus. The monopoly 
of the Kremlin-controlled company gives Moscow the ability to 
influence Belarus’s energy intensive economy by regulating both 
gas prices and supply volumes. Russia now controls almost the 
entire gas transmission infrastructure in Belarus, and owns the 
Yamal transit gas pipeline, which cuts across Belarusian territory. 
In 2011, Russia’s Gazprom acquired a 100% stake in the Belarus’s 
Beltransgaz, the owner of the country’s remaining gas pipelines. 
This means that Russia is now the sole owner of the entire gas 
transit infrastructure in Belarus and exercises almost com-
plete control over the distribution of natural gas in the coun-
try. Only a small part of the internal gas distribution network 
17 Belarus produces only 1% of the gas it consumes, http://www.cdu.ru/arti-
cles/detail.php?ID=300388
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remains in the hands of Beltopgaz18 – although Russia has made 
attempts to acquire this company also. At this stage, Moscow is 
not making full use of the control it has over Belarusian gas pipe-
lines. However, its hegemonic position gives Moscow the power to 
influence the price of gas charged to Belarusian end users, and in 
exceptional circumstances, it has the means to exert pressure on 
the government or on the managers of specific companies by peri-
odically cutting off gas supplies to selected businesses in order to, 
for example, obtain approval for a Russian buyout.
similarly, Belarus remains heavily dependent on Russian 
oil – although unlike in the case of gas, Russia does not have 
a complete monopoly in this sector. Since oil can be transported 
by means other than pipelines, Belarus is able, in theory at least, 
to diversify its sources of crude oil. In 2010, for instance, Minsk 
began purchasing oil from Venezuela. This move however should 
be seen more as Minsk’s attempt to assert its independence, 
rather than as a viable alternative to the overreliance on the oil 
supplies from Russia. The price of the Venezuelan oil shipped to 
Belarus was set at USD $656 per tonne, significantly higher than 
the USD $398 charged by Moscow19. Consequently, after signing 
a four-year agreement with Russia on the pricing formula, and 
after the elimination of export tariffs on Russian crude follow-
ing the launch of the Common Economic Space, Belarus decided in 
June 2012 to cease importing oil from Venezuela. As a result, Rus-
sia is now the sole supplier of crude oil to Belarus. Meanwhile, 
Belarus’s own oil fields produce just 1.8 million tonnes of crude 
a year. Russia’s monopoly on the supply of oil to Belarus has been 
used by Moscow to link the volume of oil exports to the quality of 
cooperation between the two counties20.
18 The company is also involved in the extraction of peat for energy production. 
19 http://newsland.com/news/detail/id/532825/ 
In 2012 the difference in the price of Venezuelan and Russian oil was even 
greater: USD $973 vs. USD $387 per tonne respectively. 
20 http://news.tut.by/economics/329003.html
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Belarus has managed to retain control over both its refineries 
– in Navapolatsk and Mozyr. Russia’s Slavneft’ currently holds 
only a minority stake (42.5%) in the Mozyr refinery. Minsk also 
still owns the Belarusian section of the Druzhba (Friendship) 
pipeline but the Kremlin remains interested in acquiring the 
country’s transport and oil processing infrastructure. Nonethe-
less, regardless of who actually owns the remaining infrastruc-
ture, Russia already effectively controls the Belarusian pet-
rochemical industry thanks to its monopoly on the supply of 
crude necessary for maintaining a price level that can render the 
industry profitable.
Russia also controls the Belarusian electricity market. The 
share of direct imports of Russian electricity in Belarus’s energy 
balance remains small. Only about 8-9% of the electricity con-
sumed in the country is imported from Russia – by the Russian 
state-owned Inter RAO UES21. Meanwhile, over 90% of its electric-
ity is produced locally – Belarus has the technical capacity to meet 
its electricity needs fully and Minsk’s decision to import electric-
ity from abroad is motivated purely by economic reasons. In addi-
tion, Belarus also has the necessary infrastructure to import elec-
tricity from Ukraine and the Baltic States. Minsk’s dependence on 
Russia in this sector, however, stems from the fact that Belaru-
sian electricity is generated almost exclusively through the 
burning of natural gas. as a sole supplier of gas to Belarus, 
Russia can directly influence both the level of production and 
the price of electricity in Belarus.
At the same time, Russia has secured its control over electric-
ity exports out of Belarus22. The 2011 agreement for the sale of 
21 In 2011, 3,173 billion kWh, with an annual consumption of 38 billion kWh – 
this co-operation, however, is also very important to Russia. Belarus is Inter 
RAO UES’ third largest foreign customer (after Finland and Lithuania).
22 Currently, in spite of its technical capacity to generate surplus electricity and 
the existence of the necessary transmission lines, Belarus export only small 
amounts of electricity due to the high cost gas required for the production.
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Beltransgaz included a clause that gives Russia the powers to con-
trol the export of electricity produced by burning Russian gas to 
any countries outside the Customs Union23. Although the exact 
details of this provision have not been made public, it is known 
that the parties have agreed to share the profits from the export 
of Belarusian electricity in proportion to their contribution to the 
production process. Meanwhile, at the time of the signing of the 
intergovernmental agreement on the construction of a nuclear 
power plant in March 2011, the countries decided to establish 
Energoconnect24 – a joint venture tasked with building the ca-
pacity for the export of Belarusian and Russian electricity from 
within Belarus, including the electricity generated in the future 
by the Belarusian nuclear power plant. Equal stakes in the joint 
venture are held by Belarus’s Belenergo and Russia’s Inter RAO 
UES25. From Moscow’s point of view, however, the purpose of the 
new company is not only to manage the profits generated from 
the export of electricity, but also to coordinate the exports from the 
Belarusian NPP with the exports from the planned NPP in the Ka-
liningrad region. Such coordination would ensure that the Bela - 
rusian electricity would not be in direct competition with the 
electricity produced by Russia.
1.4. Export
Moscow also has a big impact on the other Belarusian export in-
dustries. In fact, Russia purchases about 35% of all Belarusian 
exports26. The sale of Belarusian goods is to a large extent con-
trolled by Russia. For example, the sale of tractors in 2011 (worth 
more than USD $870 million, accounting for approximately 6% of 
23 RAI Novosti, 10 January 2012, http://ria.ru/economy/20120110/536270547.html
24 The joint venture was registered in June 2011. 
25 T. Manionok, ‘Energeticheskij most w Polszu’, in: Belorusy i Rynok, No. 23 
(1007), http://belmarket.by/ru/179/170/14260 
26 In 2011, USD $14.5 billion out of a total of USD $41.4 billion, source: http://
www.tsouz.ru/db/stat/iCU201112new/Documents/EBY201112.pdf
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Minsk’s total exports to Russia)27 was facilitated largely by the 
fact that Russia had placed the tractors on Rosagroleasing’s list of 
machines that Russian farmers and agricultural enterprises were 
able to lease on favourable terms. Similarly, Russia’s Sberbank, 
and since 2013 Russia’s VTB Bank also, have been offering prefer-
ential loans to Russian businesses interested in purchasing Bela-
rusian industrial products placed on a special list drawn up by the 
government in Minsk (among them are primarily various types 
of machine manufacturers). On the other hand, Russia continues 
to regulate access to its domestic market by periodically placing 
restrictions on importers. The measures are designed to protect 
domestic producers, as exemplified by the regularly occurring 
but temporary bans on the import of Belarusian dairy products. 
Sometimes the restrictions are put in place to pressure Minsk into 
agreeing to specific demands. This was the case for instance when 
the Kremlin suspended all Moscow-Minsk flights operated by the 
Belarusian national carrier Belavia in March 2012. The suspen-
sion of the flights came after the Belarusian government refused 
to agree to an increase in the number of Russian flights to Minsk.
Russia also has a significant influence on the export of Belaru-
sian goods to other markets. Belarusian exports are competitive 
mainly due to their low prices; and their prices are low thanks 
to the relatively low cost of energy used to produce them. By ad-
justing energy prices for Belarus, Russia is able to affect the com-
petitiveness of Belarusian production. In addition, in 2011-2012 
Belarus managed to significantly increase its revenues from the 
export of petroleum products to the European Union, after it had 
negotiated particularly favourable terms for the import of Rus-
sian oil. As a result, in 2011 the value of Belarusian exports to the 
EU increased more than 2.1 times on the previous year (reach-
ing USD $15.7 billion). In the first eight months of 2012, the trend 
continued, with exports growing by another 40%. When Russia 
stopped Minsk from re-exporting petroleum products in August 
27 http://www.tsouz.ru/db/stat/iCU201112new/Documents/EBY201112.pdf
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2012, Belarus recorded a negative trade balance. such a high level 
of dependence on Russia means that by introducing either re-
strictions or preferential conditions for Belarusian exporters, 
moscow can affect the health of the individual production sec-
tors in Belarus. By adjusting the level of Belarusian exports, 
the Kremlin can directly impact on the amount of foreign cur-
rency coming into the Belarusian budget, and by extension, on 
the level of the country’s financial stability and solvency.
1.5. The banking sector
Russia controls about 25% of the Belarusian banking sector. Cur-
rently, all the major Russian banks, especially Gazprombank, 
Sberbank, Alfa Bank, Vnesheconombank and Vneshtorgbank28, 
have established their presence in Belarus either through their 
subsidiaries or by acquiring stakes in Belarusian banks. Alfa 
Bank is currently seeking approval from the Belarusian govern-
ment for the purchase of Belinvestbank – the country’s fourth-
largest bank. The Russian banks operating in Belarus are the 
main source of foreign currency loans for Belarusian compa-
nies. Their international credibility ratings remain much higher 
than the ratings of Belarusian banks, which makes it easier for 
them to obtain loans from Western financial markets. Russian 
banks, however, refuse to finance uneconomic political projects, 
which Belarusian banks are unable to turn down. By being able to 
offer loans to selected projects, the banks effectively influence the 
development of the Belarusian economy. The banks also demand 
substantial security against the loans. In 2011, the Belarusian pot-
ash producer Belaruskali received a USD $1 billion loan from the 
Russian state-owned Sberbank, but only after it had agreed to se-
cure the loan against a 51% stake in Naftan – an oil refinery which 
the Russians have for some time now been trying to acquire. In the 
28 The most important assets acquired by Russia in Belarus include: a 71.4% 
stake in VTB Bank, 98% stake in Belgazprombank (Gazprom), 97.9% stake in 
Belpromstroibank (Sberbank), 97.4% stake in Belvnesheconombank (VEB 
Bank), and an 88% stake in Alfa Bank Belarus (Alfa Group).
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end, the company was able to refinance the loan in 2012 and Sber-
bank removed the Naftan shares from the loan agreement. This 
case, however, is a good example of how risky the overdepend-
ence of Belarusian companies on Russian loans could potentially 
become. Russian banks are also a source of loans feeding directly 
into the Belarusian budget. Recently, Minsk has asked Russia’s 
Vnesheconombank to finance Belarus’s USD $500 million contri-
bution to the construction of a nuclear power plant in the country. 
Russian banks also used to issue Belarusian government bonds in 
the Russian securities market. These developments clearly show 
that the Belarusian financial market and its stability depend to 
a large extent on Russian banking institutions.
2. Russia’s influence on domestic political processes  
in Belarus
2.1. Lobbyists in the Belarusian nomenklatura 
Russia has been consistently recruiting lobbyists from the 
Belarusian nomenklatura. Among the regular practices is the 
hiring of former high-ranking Belarusian individuals by Rus-
sian corporations. In October 2012, for example, the Russian oil 
company Russneft – controlled by Mikhail Gutseriyev – appointed 
Siarhei Martynau as special representative for Belarus just weeks 
after Martynau was dismissed as Belarusian Foreign Minister. 
Consequently, Russian companies currently employ (or have done 
so in the past) at least a dozen former senior Belarusian officials:
Name position in Belaru-sian state apparatus 
place of employment 
after leaving office 
Ivan Titenkov Head of Presidential Administration Itera 
Vasil Dauhaliou Belarusian Ambas-sador to Moscow Gazprom
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Name position in Belaru-sian state apparatus 
place of employment 
after leaving office 
Faryd Cancerau KGB general Gazprom
Valer Kez KGB general Gazprom
Viktar Rakhmanka Head of Belarusian Railways Gazprom
Uladzimir  
Yarmoshyn Prime Minister Vnesheconombank 
Paval Kallaur Deputy Head of Bela-rusian National Bank Vnesheconombank 
Ural Latypau
Foreign Affairs 
Minister and Head  
of Presidential 
Administration
Lukoil
Valer Kokarau Deputy Prime  Minister Lukoil
Uladzimir Muliak Head of Belarusneft Lukoil
Leanid Yeryn Head of Belarusian KGB Russian Railways 
Mikhail Drazhin Governor of Mogilev Region Russneft 
Uladzimir  
Matskevich
Head of Belarusian 
KGB Sovkomflot
Uladzimir Navumau Minister of Internal Affairs Rostekhnologii 
Siarhei Pasochau Presidential Advisor LenSpecSMU  (construction holding)
Vasil Maciusheuski Deputy Head  of National Bank BPS-Sbierbank
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By employing former Belarusian officials, the Russian companies 
hope to first and foremost ensure that the interests of the indi-
vidual companies are well represented. It is important to stress, 
however, that these companies are mostly state-owned enterpris-
es, whose interests are in line with the economic policies pursued 
by the Kremlin. What this practice creates therefore is a powerful 
lobby group effectively protecting Russia’s economic inter-
ests. And the possibility remains that in the future this constant-
ly expanding group of local representatives of Russian strategic 
interests could be used for political goals.
2.2. Belarus’s pro-Russian opposition
Meanwhile, Russia has not been engaged in attempts to build 
a permanent lobby within the Belarusian opposition. None-
theless, reports suggesting that Russia funds the campaigns of op-
position candidates representing parties unopposed to the Krem-
lin (particularly from Anatol Lebedko’s United Civil Party or from 
Siarhei Kalyakin’s Party of Communists of Belarus) do occasion-
ally appear in the media, particularly during periods running up 
to elections. It also seems likely that with the Kremlin’s approval, 
Russian businesses have unofficially supported Lukashenko’s 
rivals in past presidential elections: Alexander Kozulin in 2006 
and Uladzimir Nyaklyayew in 2010. Its support for alexander 
lukashenko’s political opponents is being used by Russia pri-
marily as another means of exerting pressure on the Belaru-
sian president. Nevertheless, by backing other political figures 
Russia is also attempting to secure its national interests in the 
event of unexpected changes within the Belarusian ruling camp 
– and although the probability of such a change is low, it cannot 
be completely ruled out. It is therefore in Moscow’s interest that 
any new political constellation is dominated by people willing to 
pursue a pro-Russian policy.
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2.3. Impact on society
Russia has considerable potential to influence Belarusian society. 
According to the latest census, more than 90% of the population 
use Russian as a language of everyday communication, which 
means that they are also quite likely to identify with the Russian 
cultural area. So far, however, Russia has not made any con-
scious effort to project its soft power in Belarus – by creating 
and then using ideas of cultural proximity and cultural attrac-
tiveness, while pursuing an altogether different policy to ensure 
that Russia’s national interests are protected. Belarus remains 
the only country in the CIS without a single Russkiy Mir Cen-
tre – a centre for the promotion of Russian language and culture 
(neighbouring Ukraine hosts eight such centres). There are also 
no Russian NGOs in the country. Unofficial reports suggest, how-
ever, that Konstantin Kosachov, the recently appointed head of 
Rossotrudnichestvo – a Russian federal agency coordinating the 
‘soft power’ project – has stressed the need to develop instruments 
useful in projecting Russia’s soft power in Belarus. 2012 saw a rise 
in activity among the NGOs run with the support of the Russian 
embassy in Minsk by the Russian minority in eastern Belarus. 
These developments might suggest that Moscow will be attempt-
ing to step up its soft power efforts.
Belarusian media are now completely dominated by Russian me-
dia companies. Three main Russian television channels: Channel 
One (formerly ORT), Rossiya (formerly RTR) and NTV, are avail-
able in Belarus, and tend to be more popular than the Belarusian 
channels. The strong presence of Russian media in Belarus has 
played a direct role in shaping the local worldview in ways 
that reflect moscow’s opinions on international affairs and 
a Russian vision for the state. Russia’s opinion-making in-
fluence with regard to Belarusian internal affairs, however, 
remains rather limited. All of the Russian programmes shown 
in Belarus are rebroadcast with a one-hour delay, which allows 
Minsk to censor and replace any material critical of Belarus or its 
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  0
5/
20
13
29
government. Such programmes can therefore only reach those 
members of society who are willing to look for this type of infor-
mation online – and generally such individuals are already highly 
critical of the Belarusian regime. Anti-Lukashenko campaigns 
on Russian television are invariably used as a means of exerting 
pressure on the president, and serve as signals of Moscow’s de-
termination to achieve its current objectives in its dealings with 
Minsk. The campaigns also have an impact on the Belarusian no-
menklatura who, fearing a destabilisation of the situation in Bela-
rus, respond to the signals of a possible crisis in bilateral relations 
by intensifying their efforts to protect their economic interests. 
The signals sent out through the Russian media have already led 
to reshuffles in the Belarusian ruling camp. In the run-up to the 
2010 Belarusian presidential election, Russian media conducted 
an anti-Lukashenko campaign and suggested that the then Bela-
rusian Prime Minister Siarhei Sidorsky could replace Lukashen-
ko. Soon after, the Belarusian president dismissed his head of 
government, despite the fact that Sidorsky had been one of Lu-
kashenko’s most loyal supporters.
3. minsk’s reliance on Russia for security and defence 
Belarus has become entirely reliant on Russia for security. In 
operational terms, the Belarusian armed forces are a de facto 
part of the Russian army. This applies to all aspects of the opera-
tion and command of the Belarusian armed forces. The regional 
grouping of troops, carried out under integration agreements of 
the Union State, has effectively brought the Belarusian army un-
der the command of Russia’s ground forces. Subsequently, at the 
end of 2011, Minsk completely abolished its own ground forces 
command, which in practice makes it impossible for Belarus to 
pursue independent operations. In addition, in February 2012 
Belarus ratified a 2009 agreement on joint air defence, which 
formally gives Russia complete control over the Belarusian air 
force. Minsk’s reliance on Russia is also evident in terms of army 
training. For example, in 2012 fewer than 800 people began officer 
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training in Belarus, while as many as 600 individuals attended 
such courses at Russian military schools. Currently, Belarusian 
army units offer only tactical training to its recruits. Mean-
while, operational training involving large numbers of troops 
and equipment is organised only in cooperation with the Russian 
armed forces, often on Russian soil. Full dependence on Moscow is 
also evident in the types of equipment used by Belarusian troops. 
Essentially all weapons and ammunition come from Russian fac-
tories, while the role of local Belarusian arms manufacturers is 
usually limited to subcontracting29. 
4. Coordination of foreign policy
In foreign policy, Belarus generally adopts the position urged 
by Russia. There are regular consultations between the foreign 
ministers of both countries during which the delegations agree 
a common position on international affairs, invariably in line 
with Moscow’s views on the matter. In most cases, Belarus’s na-
tional interests are indeed consistent with Russia’s foreign policy 
objectives. Consequently, Russia can always count on Minsk to 
vote in support of its position in contexts where such support can 
prove very useful – for example at the UN or the OSCE, especially 
when discussions focus on issues of democracy and human rights. 
There are however areas of foreign policy where Belarus and 
Russia have conflicting interests, and in those areas moscow 
finds it much harder to realise its objectives. For example, 
despite Russia’s expectations, Belarus has refused to recognise 
the sovereignty of Georgia’s breakaway regions of Ab khazia and 
South Ossetia. Belarus did not want to jeopardise its relations 
with Georgia. As a result of the crisis in Russian-Georgian rela-
tions, Minsk took on the role of an intermediary in trade between 
the two countries, which also generated additional revenue for 
29 This paragraph has benefited from consultation with the research fellow for 
the military aspects of international security Andrzej Wilk at the Centre for 
Eastern Studies, Warsaw, Poland. 
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state coffers. Georgia also plays an important role as Minsk’s 
spokesperson at the Eastern Partnership forum, where it seeks, 
among other things, to ensure equal representation of all Euron-
est member-states30 – the body from which the official Belarusian 
delegation has so far been excluded.
30 The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly consists of the European Parliament 
and the parliaments of the countries participating in the Eastern Partner-
ship programme.
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V. fUTURe OUTlOOK fOR RUssIaN-BelaRUsIaN 
RelaTIONs
Due to the strategic importance of Belarus to Russia, Minsk can 
permanently count on Russian support. This is particularly 
so since Moscow’s financial commitment to helping Belarus is 
a relatively small part of the Russian budget. It seems that in the 
near term, while Eurasian integration, and the expansion of this 
project to new members, remains a priority, Moscow will seek to 
demonstrate good faith in its relations with Minsk. Any change 
in Russia’s policy is unlikely to happen before the launch of the 
Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 and/or Ukraine’s accession to 
the Customs Union. Russia is also likely to offer its continued 
support to Lukashenko. Isolated by the West, Lukashenko is the 
guarantor of Minsk’s pro-Russian foreign policy. Consequent-
ly, Russia is never going to back the Western sanctions against 
Minsk. In fact, by continuing its political support for the Bela-
rusian regime, Russia may further encourage Lukashenko to 
pursue his current, highly criticised, domestic policy, in order to 
minimise the risk of improving relations between Belarus and 
the West.
The Russian-Belarusian relations, however, may also lead to con-
flict, since the long-term goals of Russia’s policy on Belarus and 
Minsk’s national interests are fundamentally conflicting. Bilat-
eral relations between the countries will deteriorate during pe-
riods of increased pressure on Minsk to play by Moscow’s rules. 
Nonetheless, the conflicts will not lead to a permanent or even 
a temporary suspension of diplomatic relations between 
moscow and minsk. A breakdown in relations cannot happen 
because Lukashenko knows that Russia’s support is vital to his 
presidency. Disputes will focus rather on the price that Belarus 
will have to pay for Moscow’s help. As a result of the concessions al-
ready made by Minsk, and due to the dependence-building nature 
of the Kremlin’s support mechanisms – alexander lukashenko 
has very limited capacity to resist Russian demands.
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In its relations with Belarus, Russia will seek primarily to in-
crease moscow’s control over the Belarusian economy, par-
ticularly by acquiring companies which are seen as strategic and/
or which could create competition for Russian businesses. In the 
long run, Russia’s ultimate objective will be to persuade Belarus to 
adopt the Russian rouble as a common currency of the Union State 
– with all fiscal control powers staying in Moscow. This would 
prevent Belarus from pursuing its own monetary policy, which 
combined with Minsk’s overdependence on Russia would allow 
Moscow to shape Minsk’s economic policies. By limiting the Bela-
rusian government’s decision-making powers on economic issues, 
Russia would be able to gain influence over the Belarusian politi-
cal scene, and in the long term, to directly affect a transition of 
power in the country. In essence, Russia would like to extend the 
system of interdependence between the countries, with a view to 
cementing the existing mechanisms of control and creating new 
ones, independent of future transformations or of a leadership 
change in Minsk.
In the near future, the formal integration between the two 
countries will proceed on the basis of a multilateral frame-
work. The creation of the Customs Union and the Common Eco-
nomic Space, and ultimately the launch of the Eurasian Economic 
Union, will require the implementation of solutions that will per-
manently link Belarus and Russia (by opening up their markets, 
or by introducing common financial, fiscal, and customs policies). 
By prioritising the project of Eurasian integration in their bilateral 
relations, however, Belarus is going to lose its special relationship 
with Russia – which it has been enjoying within the framework of 
bilateral relations and within the Union State. Russia will try to 
fit its bilateral relations with Belarus into the overall principles of 
international relations within the post-Soviet area established by 
Moscow in the framework of the integration process.
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